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Abstract: 
 
Shadow economy has many repercussions affecting most sectors of the economy. Our 
research question is how shadow economy affects income distribution. The contribution of 
the present paper is that if is found that shadow economy worsens income distribution.  
 
Our sample includes the following countries Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and UK. It 
becomes evident that, international accounting standards and international standards of 
auditing should be adopted by EU members to eliminate shadow economy, and thus promote 
not only economic growth but also political stability.  
 
The structure of this paper has as follows. Literature review will be presented in sector1. In 
sector 2 the econometric model will be analyzed and finally conclusions will be discussed in 
sector 3. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The main reason of shadow economy is tax evasion. An extensive literature is found 
in (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Shadow economy, which is a world-wide problem, 
has many forms. One of them and very common is earning management, that is used 
by companies to pay less taxes (Guenther, 1994).     
 
This is done mainly by large companies4. Earnings management has been examined 
by many economists: DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991), Cahan (1992) and showed a 
considerable increase during the period 1997-2002 (Cohen et al., 2004). The rapid 
technological progress as well as the fast change in capital markets are two 
important reasons that made accounting system very complicated. According to 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973) the international auditing 
standards are one important determinant factor to reduce tax evasion. Consequently, 
auditing is required to guarantee that company’s income statements become 
trustworthy. Further, Kerr (2015) asserts that countries, where companies have 
greater levels of transparency, experience lower levels of tax avoidance. Further, an 
increased transparency gives better, trustworthy and reliable information to the 
would-be investors. Hence, international investments will be increased ending up 
with economic growth (Georgiou, 2013a; Thalassinos et al., 2012a; 2012b).  
 
2. Shadow Economy’s Impacts 
 
2.1 Trying to restrict shadow economy is difficult 
 
According to (Hanlon et al., 2008) the increase in book-tax conformity resulted in a 
decrease in the informativeness of the firms’ accounting earnings. To our knowledge 
this is a unique result in that it is a case of a tax law change that has an adverse 
consequence on the informativeness of accounting earnings. Besides, based on 
(Georgiou, 2013b) restricting shadow economy has some costly side effects. 
 
2.2 Shadow economy’s impact on Share Prices 
 
According to Weber (2006) analysts’ systematic errors proxy for similar errors made 
by investors concerning book-tax differences for future earnings lead to mispricing. 
According to (Kim et al., 2011) Using a large sample of U.S. firms for the period 
1995–2008, we provide strong and robust evidence that corporate tax avoidance is 
positively associated with firm-specific stock price crash risk. According to 
Georgiou (2013) shadow economy pushes up share prices. There are countries where 
there are firms not listed in the stock market, in which tax evasion takes place. In 
                                                          
4 It is made mainly by large companies that have well organized accounting department. 
Hence, large companies (compared to the small and medium firms) are in a position to show 
a better picture in order to attract investors in the future. Hence, there is a distortion in 
market competition. 
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these countries the method of earnings management happens many times. Further, 
earnings management takes place in order to show that the company has met its 
targets so as to increase its share price (Bartov et al., 2002). It should be also noted 
that firms aim to remain competitive and to meet their obligations to third parties 
(Cormier and Magnan, 1996) to avoid bankruptcy. Hence, they sometimes hide 
various costs, to avoid an increase in the interest rates of their loans5. 
 
2.3 Shadow economy impact on Inflation and Taxation 
 
According to (Mazhar and Méon, 2012) in a sample of developed and developing 
countries during the period 1999-2007, a positive relation is found between inflation 
and the size of the shadow economy. Further, tax burden tends to increase shadow 
economy (Schneider, 2012). 
 
2.4 Shadow economy impact on Competition 
 
According to the study of (Armbrecht and Carlback, 2011) after making a survey of 
535 restaurants in Sweden it is found that it is very difficult not only to survive as a 
law-abiding firm, but also that the unfair competition (due to shadow economy) 
affects the whole sector’s progress and development. In other words, shadow 
economy is an obstacle to the competition. Firms in a globalized environment 
resorted to earnings management in order to attract would-be investors6 (Vanasco, 
1998). 
 
2.5 Corruption and shadow economy 
 
According to (Dreher and Schneider, 2010) there is not any significant relationship 
between corruption and the size of the shadow economy. However, in low income 
countries corruption and the shadow economy are complements and there is no 
protection of investors Wang (2014). 
 
2.6 Developed Economies vs Rest of the World 
 
According to (Fleming et al., 2000; Schneider and Enste, 2000) shadow economy is 
larger in transition and developing countries Wang (2014). Particularly, within EU 
southern EU States have higher levels of shadow economy7.  
 
                                                          
5 This lack of transparency distorts fair competition and is an obstacle for economic growth 
(Georgiou, 2013a). 
6 This lack of transparency distorts fair competition and is an obstacle for economic growth 
(Georgiou, 2013a). 
7See, for example, Contini, B. “The Second Economy of Italy”, in Vito Tanzi, ed., The 
Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and 
Company, 1982) pp.199-208. 
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2.7 The role of institutions, Democracy and State governance to fight shadow 
economy 
 
An improvement in the institutional quality reduce shadow economy and corruption 
(Dreher et al., 2009; Torgler and Schneider, 2007). Similarly, according to Torgler et 
al., (2010) local autonomy and federal system tend to reduce shadow economy. 
Further, direct democracy and democratic institutions cause a decrease of the size of 
shadow economy (Teobaldelli and Schneider, 2012). Besides, world history has 
shown that countries, having robust accounting systems and high levels of 
transparency, enjoy economic growth and political stability (Georgiou et al., 2015; 
Bekiaris et al., 2011). 
 
2.8 Shadow economy on entrepreneurship 
 
According to (Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2012) shadow economy hinders 
entrepreneurial entry. Further, shadow economy is an obstacle to entrepreneurial 
activity (Georgiou, 2013a). 
 
2.9 Shadow Economy on Unemployment 
 
According to the work of Boeri and Garibaldi, (2002) an effort by the official state 
to reduce shadow economy will increase unemployment. This finding agrees with 
the study of Georgiou, (2013b) indicating that shadow economy is hard to fight 
without any cost of side effects. 
 
2.10 Shadow Economy’s Impact on Income Distribution 
 
Since, tax avoidance reduces the total tax revenues, then “tax burden” on “honest” 
tax payers are expected to go up8 in order to cover the tax revenue generated gap. 
Consequently, this tax burden will be at the cost of income distribution (Georgiou, 
2013c; Alm, 2014). In other words, only “honest” tax payers will pay this increased 
tax burden, which will cause a further reduction in their disposable income and 
finally income distribution will be worse than before. 
 
2.11 Conclusions of this section 
 
After the afore mentioned it becomes clear that shadow economy can affect 
economy in various ways and in many sectors. Tax evasion causes lower tax 
revenues and ultimately the higher effective tax rate (to cover the tax revenue gap) 
falls on the shoulders of honest tax payers. Hence, it is expected a priori that shadow 
economy will affect income distribution. Our research question is then “how shadow 
economy affects income distribution”. 
                                                          
8 In other words, effective tax rate will increase in order to compensate for the reduction of 
tax revenues, which is created by tax evasion. 
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3. Income Distribution Estimation 
 
Gini statistic is worldwide known as an indicator of income distribution9. Following 
the definition of OECD10 index GINI11 measures the degree of income distribution 
(and in some cases the consumption expenditure) among individuals or households. 
Its value ranges from 0 to 1 (or as a percentage from 0 to 100). When its value 
equals to 0, then this is the ideal situation in which income distribution is completely 
equal among individuals. On the contrary, the value 1 indicates the extreme case in 
which income distribution is totally unequal. Consequently, the higher the value of 
Gini the worse income distribution is. However, there are intermediate cases. In fact, 
according to Luebker (2010) an index Gini around 0,20 indicates a low level of 
unequal income distribution. Values around 0,25 show a moderate level of unequal 
income distribution, while values around 0,35 indicate a highly unequal distribution 
of income and finally for values beyond 0,50 then there is an extremely unequal 
income. In the graph 1 one can see the different levels of income distribution 
inequality between USA and many countries of EU. 
 
Graph 1. Gini levels in USA and EU countries 
 
Source: Eurostat, OECD 
 
One can observe in the graph 1 that income distribution in the USA is during period 
2000-2010 worse than many European countries. More specifically, between the 
selected European countries the worst income distribution appears in Portugal, and 
the remaining countries have better income distribution improving according to the 
                                                          
9 To be comprehensive, there are many ways to estimate income distribution (Stewart et al., 
2005).  However, Gini index is the one world-wide used.  
10http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4842 
11 It took the name after the famous Italian Statistician Corrado Gini (1884-1965). 
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following order: Greece, UK, Spain, Ireland, Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, France, 
Germany, Finland, Austria, Sweden and Denmark. 
 
It should be noted that recent world economic crisis had as a repercussion the 
worsening of income distribution (Özlem Onaran, 2009). Besides, the German 
policy concerning the budgetary discipline was strongly criticized by IMF 
(Schrörsand Pache, 2009). It is well known that the various austerity measures 
resulted in a consumption decline12. Furthermore, firms faced losses13and 
unemployment has risen. Hence, austerity measures worsened income distribution 
(Theodoropoulou and Watt, 2011; Georgiou, 2012).  
 
4. Income distribution determinants 
 
However, it should be mentioned that shadow economy is not the only income 
distribution determinant. In fact, entrepreneurship, by creating jobs, tends to reduce 
income inequality (Georgiou, 2009), because entrepreneurship reduces 
unemployment14. Further, education spending improves income distribution, for 
educated people find jobs easily (Georgiou, 2010b)15. Besides, globalization can 
improve income distribution (IMF, 2007); (Georgiou, 2010)16. Inflation is also a 
serious factor that worsens income distribution (Jäntti and Jerkins, 2001; Georgiou, 
2010a; Oberdabernig, 2013). Furthermore, economic crisis and the imposed austerity 
measures tend to worsen income distribution (Georgiou, 2012c; Theodoropoulou 
and Watt, 2011; Özlem Onaran, 2009).  One should not forget the contribution of the 
trade unions towards the improvement of income distribution (Checchi and Garcia-
Peñalosa, 2005; Georgiou, 2012a)17. Finally, it is claimed that decentralization 
(Georgiou, 2012b) as well as Federal system and political stability (Georgiou, 2015) 
help to improve income distribution. 
 
5. Our Research Hypothesis 
 
Based on the afore-mentioned our research hypothesis is: Ho: “Shadow economy has 
no impact on income distribution” 
 
5.1 Data 
 
                                                          
12 Mainly in Greece (Georgiou et al.,2015). 
13 This can be explained by the consumption-led growth theory (Saito, 2007). 
14 In fact a reduction in unemployment improves income distribution (Jäntti and Jerkins, 
2001). 
15 Again in this case unemployment is reduced. 
16 According to (Atif et al., 2012) the impact of globalisation on income distribution differs 
among countries. 
17 It should be mentioned that trade unions are also responsible for the creation of “wage 
rigidities” (Toichiro Asada et al., 2003), that might cause unemployment. This topic however 
goes beyond the limits of the present paper. 
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Variable (Gini) is taken from Eurostat. Shadow Economy data (sh_ec) as a 
percentage of official GDP18 are taken from (Schneider et al., 2010; Schneider, 
2013). The period covered is 2000-2013 annually, and our data refer to Austria 
(2000-2013), Belgium (2000-2013), Cyprus (2004-2013), Denmark (2000-2013), 
Finland (2000-2013), France (2003-2013), Germany (2000-2013), Greece (2000-
2013), Ireland (2000-2012), Italy (2000-2013), Netherlands (2000-2013), Portugal 
(2000-2013), Spain (2000-2013), Sweden (2000-2013) and UK (2000-2013). 
 
5.2 The Regression 
 
The econometric model is shown by equation (1). 
 
  (1) 
 
This model is estimated by Panel EGLS (Cross section weights)19, at a significance 
level α = 0,01. 
 
5.3 Results 
 
Table 1. Regression Results in Brief 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Constant 24,870 0,0000 
sh_ec 0,266 0,0021 
R2 0,160 … 
Adjusted R2 0,156 … 
S.E. of regression 3,476 … 
F-statistic 38,217 0,0000 
Durbin-Watson stat 1,970 … 
 
5.4 Comments 
 
With a sample size equal to 202, (at 1%) dU = 1,6850 < DW = 1,970029. Hence, 
there is no serial correlation in this model. All coefficients (including the constant 
term) are statistically significant, and positive, for all p-values<α. Finally, p-value of 
(F statistic) <α. This indicates that the vector of explanatory variable does explain 
the variations of the vector of dependent variable (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
The determination coefficient indicates that 16% of the variations in income 
distribution are explained by the present model. 
 
                                                          
18 Without allowing for the shadow economy part. 
19 For a detailed econometric analysis see (Halkos and Georgiou, 2005). 
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Graph 2. The Distribution of Residuals 
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Series: Standardized Residuals
Sample 1 202
Observations 202
Mean      -0.096584
Median  -0.041384
Maximum  7.303453
Minimum -6.840950
Std. Dev.   3.466024
Skewness   0.252625
Kurtosis   2.210404
Jarque-Bera  7.396066
Probability  0.024772
 
 
Jarque-Bera (JB) statistic is estimated by the following equation (2): 
 
 
 
where: S (skewness), Κ (kurtosis) and n (the sample size). JB statistic follows a chi-
square distribution20, and the null hypothesis Ho is: “the residuals of the regression 
are normally distributed” (Vogelvang, 2005).  
 
5.5 Robustness of the Model 
 
The following tests aim to check if our model is robust. 
 
Table 2. Unit Root Test21 for [gini] 
Method Statistic P-value 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4,333  0,0000 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  67,433  0,0000 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  169,814  0,0000 
 
5.6 Comments 
 
Variable gini is stationary22 since all p-values < α. 
 
 
                                                          
20 See (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
21 A similar unit root test can be found in (Georgiou et al.,2015) 
22 All variables must be stationary in order to be able to estimate the regression. 
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Table 3. Unit Root Test for [sh_ec] 
Method Statistic P-value 
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -3,040  0,0012 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  53,986  0,0022 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  176,691  0,0000 
 
Variable sh_ec is stationary23 since all p-values<α. 
 
Table 4. Diagnostic Tests of Model Robustness24 
TESTS Model  Critical values 
(α = 0,01) 
Heteroskedasticity (*) 0,000 11,350 
RESET (**) 0,014 6,340 
Normality (***) 7,397 9,210 
Notes: 
(*)   Regression of the log of squared residuals on X (a Harvey test) 
(**)    Regression of residuals on 
2Yˆ  
(***)  Normality test (Jarque Bera) (see Vogelvang, 2005) 
 
The robustness tests (see Table 4) are made in order to check whether the basic 
assumptions for the construction of the above model are met. To begin with, the 
assumption of homoskedasticity is fulfilled since, according to the above Harvey 
test, the statistic is less than the critical value 11,350. Besides, the specification of 
this model is correct, since the RESET statistic is less than the critical value 6,340. 
Further, the distribution of the regression residuals in this model is normal, since 
Jarque Bera statistic is less than the critical value 9,210. Finally, there is no serial 
correlation, since at α = 1%, dU = 1,6850 < DW= 1,970. Needless to mention that all 
variables [Gini]and [sh_ec] are stationary, since   Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat,  
ADF - Fisher Chi-square, and PP - Fisher Chi-square have all p-values<α. 
Consequently, the afore-mentioned model is robust. 
 
6. Concluding 
 
6.1 Findings and discussion 
 
According to this model at a level of significance 1% the afore mentioned research 
hypothesis is not accepted. More specifically, shadow economy, which is created by 
tax evaders, has a positive impact on Gini coefficient. In economic jargon this means 
that as shadow economy grows then income distribution worsens. This finding is in 
agreement with Georgiou (2013c), where a different econometric model was used.  
                                                          
23 All variables must be stationary in order to be able to estimate the regression. 
24 These robustness tests are based on Halkos (2003). 
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This impact on Gini is not fair, and in the long run it might be unfortunately a 
“motive” for the today’s “legal and honest taxpayers” to turn into “tax evaders” in 
the future. If this takes place, then the size of shadow economy will increase even 
further, and the created lack of transparency will hinder entrepreneurs to invest and 
create economic growth. Thus, shadow economy will be an obstacle to economic 
growth. 
 
Apart from that consequence, according to this model income distribution will 
worsen even further, thus poverty will tend to increase. This situation will create 
some social problems in the long run. According to the empirical analysis of 
Georgiou (2014) a poverty increase in EU will cause a decrease in confidence on the 
Institutions of the EU and the general entity of EU. Policy makers should take this 
seriously. 
 
Consequently, international accounting standards and international standards of 
auditing should be adopted by EU members in order to eliminate tax avoidance, 
which is a great segment of shadow economy, and thus promote not only economic 
growth but also political stability. 
 
6.2 Further research 
 
This model refers on the impact of total shadow economy on income distribution. 
The afore mentioned model could be enhanced by taking into account additional 
income distribution determinant factors, such as: entrepreneurship (Georgiou, 2009), 
education spending (Georgiou, 2010b), austerity measures (Georgiou, 2012c); 
(Theodoropoulou and Watt, 2011); (Özlem Onaran, 2009) and finally economic 
crisis, which hits mainly southern EU. 
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